nounced tests performed underground at the NTS, and 73% were listed in open seismic catalogues prior to the DoE announcement. Soviet stations, at epicentral distances as great as 10,000 km from the test site, identi fied all unannounced tests with an estimated magnitude of 4 or larger. U.S. networks, lo cated at regional distances, detected 89% of all tests since 1983, and these tests had seis mic magnitudes between 1.4 and 4.5.
While this study should not be regarded as a comprehensive evaluation of the moni toring capability of seismic stations, it does demonstrate the increasing capability of multi-use seismic stations and networks to de tect and identify small seismic events. This ca pability will be useful for monitoring once an international Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is signed.
Seismic Event Detection at the Nevada Test Site
Since December 1993, the DoE has re leased information on 204 unannounced nu clear tests performed underground at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The information on each test included its date and time, the test area, the depth of burial, and a yield range.
The NTS was established in 1951 and is lo cated in the Basin and Range province, a re gion that is marked by high seismicity with earthquakes at shallow depths ( Figure 1 ). In this tectonic setting, the most difficult task of identifying a nuclear test is to discriminate the event against regional earthquakes. Large seismic events at the NTS are generally re corded by enough seismic stations and with a sufficient signal-to-noise ratio to allow the identification of the event on the basis of dis tinct signal characteristics. Furthermore, rela tively few earthquakes occur each year within the general area of the NTS with mag nitudes larger than two or three (Figure 1 ) [Gomberg, 1991; Gawthrop and Can, 1988] . DoE's policy is to only report the yield of announced tests as either less than 20 kT or 20-150 kT [U. S. Congress, 1989] . With a few exceptions, two tests in 1970 and 1973, all of the previously unannounced tests were re ported to have yields below 20 kT and may have been quite small.
The detection and identification of small seismic events at the NTS can be difficult. Small events are likely to be recorded by only a few stations, and the recordings often show poor signal-to-noise ratios, making such events difficult to detect and identify. Unfortunately, at the same time, several hun dred earthquakes with magnitudes smaller than two are detected at the NTS each year (Figure 1) .
Several facts can help in identifying nu clear tests at the NTS. First, the geographic boundaries of the relatively small areas used for testing are well known. Second, relatively few earthquakes with magnitudes above 2 or 3 occur within the NTS region despite the relatively high seismicity. Finally, most nu clear tests are performed at depths less than 600 m while most earthquakes in this region occur at depths greater than 5-8 km. Conse quently, in the routine analysis of seismic data, regional and teleseismic networks gen erally designate a detected seismic event as a nuclear test at the NTS if the event can be conclusively located at shallow depth within the relatively small regions used for testing.
NTS Explosions Recorded at Regional Distances
The ability of regional networks to detect small, unannounced tests at the NTS is dem onstrated using data from the following three networks established to monitor regional tec tonic processes along the San Andreas Fault System and across the Basin As mentioned earlier, none of these net works had the specific task of monitoring the NTS for testing activity, nor were they de signed for that purpose. During the first dec ade of unannounced nuclear testing at the NTS, the SCSN was operating four single-com ponent stations along the California/Nevada border with the closest station approximately 200 km from the test site. By 1986, the SCSN had increased its station density in this re gion to 12 stations. The SGBSN and WGBSN, initially installed in the late 1970s and 1960s, respectively, reached a station density of ap proximately 100 mostly single-component high-frequency seismic stations deployed within a radius of 300 km of the test site in the early 1980s.
Over the three decades examined, the re gional networks included in this study used two distinctly different procedures to detect and catalog seismic events. The SCSN moni tored all seismic activity using continuous analog recordings. Analysts routinely exam ined the SCSN recordings to detect, identify and catalog seismic events of interest. The SGBSN and the WGBSN relied mostly on auto matic event detection. To detect and declare a preliminary event, these networks required three or more stations to automatically trig ger the recording of the event, which analysts would then identify and catalog.
Prior to the DoE's disclosure, U.S. regional networks independently detected 73% (148) of all previously unannounced nuclear tests (Figure 2 ). These tests were listed at the time of their occurrence in the open bulletins of the networks. Since 1983, when unan nounced nuclear testing resumed after a 3-year period during which all tests were announced, regional networks inde pendently detected 89% (16 of 18) of all un announced tests.
The smallest signals detected were those from a test on December 9,1988, with a local magnitude of 1.6, and one test on August 14, 1985, with a local magnitude of 1.4. Although these tests were extremely small, they were re corded by enough instruments to identify them within the boundaries of the approxi mately 500 km 2 NTS Yucca Flat test area. The location estimate for the 1988 test was within 1.3 km of the drillhole and 300 m of the true burial depth.
After the DoE disclosure of the test detona tion times, the total number of detected unan nounced tests reached 85% when the reexamination of the continuously recorded seismic data at the SCSN revealed evidence of 25 additional tests that were not listed in the bulletins of the networks at the time they occurred (Figure 2 ). Of these 25 tests, 21 had been performed in the 1960s and four in the 1970s. While the smallest tests listed in the bulletins during this time period had magnitudes between 3.0 and 3.5, the smallest tests detected after the DoE announcement had magnitudes of about 2.2. Surprisingly, some of these tests were esti mated to have magnitudes above 2.6, the threshold magnitude for the SCSN to discrimi nate events at the NTS. These relatively large tests may have been recorded by SCSN sta tions, but not listed in their bulletins due to the strictly scientific focus of the network. The detection of nuclear tests was not con sidered important during such times of fre quent testing, and therefore nuclear tests were often excluded from the earthquake bulletins.
No evidence was found in the archived SCSN records to confirm about 15% of the pre viously unannounced tests at the NTS. Most of the undetected tests were conducted dur ing the 1960s and 1970s. Only two tests con ducted since the early 1980s remain seismically undetected: one on September 29,1983, and another on October 30,1985 (Figure 2 ). When these tests were detonated, the SGBSN, with a detection threshold of less than magnitude 1 for events located on the test site, had only one or two stations de ployed near the test area. Since the tests were not detected, it is likely that they were ex tremely small, with magnitudes below the SGBSN detection threshold, and that their yields were equivalent to no more than a few tens of tons [Richards and Zavales, 1996; Mur phy, 1981] . Overall, 31 tests could not be confirmed in this study. This number may decrease as addi tional data become available. However, some U.S. nuclear tests had zero yields, which can not be detected seismically. This may account for at least a few of the unannounced tests. Zero yield tests, however, are not of great con cern to monitoring efforts aimed at uncovering a clandestine nuclear weapons design program.
NTS Explosions Recorded at Teleseismic Distances
At teleseismic distances (larger than 1500 km), monitoring at the NTS is strongly de pendent on ray path; and at distances several thousand kilometers from the NTS test site, the ability of stations and networks to detect small tests varies significantly. The following analysis is based on data from two networks in the former Soviet Union (FSU) that were operated by the Complex Seismological Ex pedition (CSE) of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of the Physics of the Earth and its Institute of the Dynamics of the Geosphere (IDG).
These networks were initially installed to monitor global and regional seismicity, to provide high-quality seismic data for re search on local microseismic noise condi tions, and to monitor nuclear explosions. Between 1961 and 1990, IDG and CSE oper ated more than 160 seismic stations and ar rays throughout the FSU, many of which were equipped with three-component, broadband channels as well as narrowband vertical channels.
Over several decades of monitoring, some IDG and CSE stations showed high sensitivity to events at the NTS. For those stations, the epicentral distances to the NTS vary from about 5000 km for station Iul'tin in eastern Rus sia to about 10,000 km for stations Borovoye and Zerenda in Northern Kazakhstan ( Figure  3 ). Despite the great distance from the NTS, Northern Kazakhstan is known to be a superior location for monitoring the test site because of low seismic attenuation for ray paths from the NTS and the very low microseismic noise levels [Richards etai, 1992; Adushkin and An, 1990] .
The capability of station Borovoye in Northern Kazakhstan to monitor the NTS is il lustrated in Figure 3 ( To allow a direct comparison between events detected at teleseismic and regional distances, we assigned magnitude values de rived by the SCSN to all tests detected by IDG and CSE. Three tests with magnitudes smaller than ML 3.5 were detected by Soviet Fig. 3 
Conclusions and Implications for Nuclear Monitoring
The analysis of the unannounced tests clearly demonstrates the value of multi-use seismic stations as a strong deterrent to clan destine nuclear weapons testing. Any nation attempting a secret nuclear weapons test would have to take into account not only the formal treaty monitoring network, but also the increasing number of multi-use seismo graphic networks that are being deployed around the world.
At teleseismic distances, the capabilities of these networks might be as low as magni tude 4 or below, as indicated by the capabil ity of the Russian networks to monitor nuclear explosions at the Nevada Test Site. A magnitude 4 seismic event corresponds roughly to a 1-kiloton nuclear weapon test. If stations exist within regional distances, the capability might be further reduced below magnitude 2, as indicated by the capability of the western U.S. networks to detect events at the Nevada Test Site. A de tection threshold below magnitude 2 would preclude the likelihood of a tamped explo sion of even a few tons going undetected.
No matter what system is developed for the routine monitoring of a CTBT, additional resources will exist for most areas of the world that can contribute to the monitoring task. As the United States and other nations negotiate a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the strong deterrence value of existing multi ple-use seismographic networks should be recognized and provisions should be incor porated within the treaty to encourage open access to the data from such networks.
Observations Suggest Earth's Inner Core Spins Faster Than the Earth Itself
The inner core and the rest of the Earth are perpetually racing one another, and it seems the inner core is winning by a stun ning distance. This proposition, once wholly abstract and theoretical, now has firm grounding in quantifiable observation.
That the solid inner core of Earth should rotate-and faster than its surroundingshas been suspected, modeled, and postu lated for about a decade, but never verified. Now two seismologists from the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory, Xiaodong Song and Paul Richards, have announced that seis mological records provide the evidence geophysicists need to confirm that the inner core is spinning.
According to Song and Richards, the Earth's innermost core rotates in the same di rection as the rest of the planet, but slightly faster. The researchers have calculated that in one day the inner core spins about twothirds of a second faster than its surround ings. Therefore, in a year, a given point on the surface of the core turns almost 19 km fur ther than a point on the surface of the crust. Such movement is about 100,000 times faster than the drift of the continents, and it means that the core essentially laps the Earth by a complete revolution every 400 years. In the past century of seismological measurements, the core has gained about a quarter turn on the whole planet, Song and Richards found.
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